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Extending Yagil exchange ratio determination model to
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Abstract
This article extends, in a stochastic environment, the Yagil (1987) model
which establishes, in a deterministic dividend discount model, a range for
the exchange ratio in a stock-for-stock merger agreement. Here, we general-
ize Yagil’s work letting both pre- and post-merger dividends grow randomly
over time. If Yagil focuses only on changes in stock prices before and af-
ter the merger, our stochastic environment allows to keep in account both
shares’ expected values and variance, letting us to identify a more complex
bargaining region whose shape depends on mean and standard deviation of
the dividends’ growth rate.
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1 Introduction, literature review and motivation
Mergers and acquisitions have been, and still are, a widely studied topic in finan-
cial literature, under both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Companies
merge for various reasons, but with a unique goal: to create synergy, the addi-
tional equity value of the newly created company (M) when compared to the
pre-existing ones, namely the acquiring (A) and the acquired, or target, (B). In
a stock-for-stock merger, B’s shareholders receive, for each stock they give up,
r (the exchange ratio) stocks of company M . Shareholders of companies A and
B will agree on some value for r only if their wealth increases after the merger.
Negotiation on r establishes the portion of synergy that goes to stockholders of
pre-merger companies. It is therefore crucial to identify a bargaining region, that
is a non-empty range for r.
First attempts in this direction go back to Larson and Gonedes (1969) and
Yagil (1987). Larson and Gonedes represent the value of all companies in terms
of their price-earnings ratios, and determine the minimum and maximum r ac-
ceptable for all shareholders in terms of M ’s price-earnings ratio.
Yagil tackles the same issue using the dividend discount model (DDM) by
Williams (1938) and Gordon and Shapiro (1956). Here the price of a common
stock is the sum of all discounted future dividends companies will pay to share-
holders; Further, dividends are assumed to grow at a constant and deterministic
rate. Yagil determines the bargaining region for each synergy generating M divi-
dends’ growth rate.
In both these models, A and B’s shareholders have conflicting interests: the
acquiring (acquired) company aims at fixing r as low (high) as possible.
Moretto and Rossi (2008) determine, in an equilibrium context, the exchange
ratio in terms of the expected synergy created by the merger and the companies’
riskiness, while Toll and Hering (2017) analyze the effects of a merger by means
of utility theory.
This paper generalizes Yagil’s model by exploiting the Stochastic Dividend
Discount Model (SDDM) (Hurley and Johnson (1994), Hurley and Johnson (1998),
Yao (1997), and Hurley (2013)). Future dividends are driven by a stochastic
growth rate and evolve in a Markovian fashion. Along with an expression for the
expected current stock price, recently, a formula for variance (Agosto and Moretto
(2015)) and covariance between stock prices (Agosto et al. (2016)) have been de-
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termined. A further step in this direction can be found in D’Amico (2013),
D’Amico (2016), and Barbu et al. (2017), where stochastic dividends evolve ac-
cording to a more general semi-Markov dynamics.
In our stochastic setting, shareholders accept to merge if they all benefit not
only from an increase in the expected value of their random wealth but also from
a reduction in its variance. The bargaining area, now a function of both mean
and standard deviation of M dividends’ growth rate, shows that large values for
this dividends’ expected growth rate is not always good news as this quantity
affects also company M stock price variance. Stockholders might, consequentely,
end up, after the merger, in a riskier position.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical frame-
work and determines the bargaining region in a SDDM setting, Section 3 provides
a numerical example, Section 4 eventually concludes.
2 A SDDM extension of Yagil’s model
The main assumption behind the stochastic extension of the Dividend Discount
Model is that the total amount of dividends D˜(t) a company pays in t to its
shareholders evolve through time by means of the stochastic recursive equation
D˜ (t+ 1) = D˜ (t) (1 + g˜), being D(0) the last paid certain dividend and g˜ the
dividends’ growth rate represented by the following finite-state random variable,
g˜ =
{
rate of growth g1 g2 ... gn
probability p1 p2 ... pn
with −1 < g1 < ... < gn, P [g˜ = gs] > 0, s = 1, ..., n, and p1 + ...+ pn = 1.
Subscript i = A,B,M relates to the acquiring, acquired, and resulting com-
panies. We assume that each company is characterized by a specific distribution
for g˜, with g¯i and σg˜i , respectively, its expected value and variance. Let Ni denote
the number of company i’s outstanding stocks and d˜i(t) = D˜i(t)/Ni its random
dividends-per-share (dps) at time t. The current random stock price is
P˜i(0) =
+∞∑
t=1
di(0) (1 + g˜i)
t
(1 + ki)
t
, (1)
being ki company i constant and deterministic risk-adjusted discount rate. Com-
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pany i’s equity value is, then, W˜i(0) = P˜i(0)Ni.
M ’s dps in 0 is
dM (0) =
DA(0) +DB(0)
NA + rNB
.
and will grow according to g˜M .
Hurley and Johnson (1994, 1998) and Yao (1997) prove that the expected
stock price is, as long as ki > g¯i,
P¯i(0) =
di(0) (1 + g¯i)
ki − g¯i
. (2)
Agosto and Moretto (2015) determine the stock price variance
σ2i (0) =
P¯ 2i (0)h (g¯i, σg˜i) (1 + ki)
2
(1 + g¯i)
2
,
being
h (g¯i, σg˜i) =
σg˜i√
∆i
, σg˜i > 0,
and where ∆i = (1 + ki)
2−(1 + g¯i)2−σ2g˜i has to be strictly positive. It will reveal
handy to denote the coefficient of variation of P˜i (0) as
fi =
h (g¯i, σg˜i) (1 + ki)
1 + g¯i
.
The crucial assumption in Yagil is the choice of a deterministic growth rate
forM . In his setting, the agreement is attainable if stockholders of both company
A and B enjoy a positive gain in wealth, that is PM (0) ≥ PA(0) and rPM (0) ≥
PB(0), being Pi(0) the stock price of company i resulting when a deterministic
growth rate replaces g˜i in (1).
Moreover, Yagil assumes that the discount rate of the resulting company is the
weighted average of kA and kB , with weights equal to the relative equity values.
That is like saying that the merger does not influence the overall risk of the
resulting company with respect of the pre-existing ones. Here, kM is calculated
accordingly.
The SDDM generalization of Yagil’s model assumes that shareholders of com-
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pany A (resp. B) are better off, in terms of expected values, when
P¯M (0) ≥ P¯A(0) (resp. rP¯M (0) ≥ P¯B(0)) (3)
and, in terms of variance, when
σ2M (0) ≤ σ2A(0) (resp. r2σ2M (0) ≤ σ2B(0)) (4)
hold. An increase in terms of expected wealth for both groups of shareholders
(i.e., condition (3) holds) occurs when
NA
NB
W¯B(0)
W¯M (0) − W¯B(0)
≤ r ≤ NA
NB
W¯M (0)− W¯A(0)
W¯A(0)
, (5)
where W¯i(0) = NiP¯i(0). There is a reduction in variance (i.e., condition (4) holds)
when
NA
NB
W¯M(0)fM − W¯A(0)fA
W¯A(0)fA
≤ r ≤ NA
NB
W¯B(0)fB
W¯M (0)fM − W¯B(0)fB
. (6)
Interval (5) is not empty when W¯M (0) ≥ W¯A(0) + W¯B(0) that is, the merger
creates synergy with positive expected value; (5) collapses to a unique point r∗ =
P¯B(0)/P¯A(0) in case of no synergy, that is if W¯M (0) = W¯A(0) + W¯B(0).
Interval (6) is instead not empty when
fMW¯M (0) ≤ fAW¯A (0) + fBW¯B (0) . (7)
Condition (7) carries some interesting remarks. Firstly, as the coefficient of vari-
ation resembles the reciprocal of the Sharpe’s ratio, shareholders should prefer
stocks with smaller f , that is with larger risk premium (per unit of deviation).
This means that if company M guarantees a sufficiently large risk compensation,
stockholders will benefit from a reduction in their wealth’s variance. In case of
no synergy, (7) becomes
fM ≤ ωAfA + ωBfB, ωi =
W¯i (0)
W¯A (0) + W¯B (0)
, i = A,B, (8)
whose rhs term is the weighted average of fA and fB with, as weights, the relative
equity values of A and B. Merger is, then, profitable if M is less risky than an
equity-valued ‘portfolio’ of A and B.
5
Unlike (5), in case of no synergy interval (6) does not collapse into a single
value. Substituting W¯M (0) = W¯A(0) + W¯B(0) into (6) leads to
NA
NB
(
fM
fA
− 1
)
+
P¯B(0)
P¯A(0)
fM
fA
≤ r ≤
(
NB
NA
(
fM
fB
− 1
)
+
P¯A(0)
P¯B(0)
fM
fB
)−1
. (9)
This interval shrinks to r∗ only when fM = fA and fM = fB, the case in which
A and B have the same Sharpe ratio and no risk reduction is possible.
Finally, it is easy to prove that the intersection between (5) and (6) is not
empty if fM ≤ min (fA; fB); that is, the new company is even less risky than
the less risky of both A and B, a situation that guarantees proper diversification.
This condition also ensures that (8) holds so that (9) contains, at least, r∗.
3 A numerical example
To better understand the effects of SDDM on the pre-merger negotiation, thus
highlighting the difference with Yagil’s setting, we consider a numerical example
where the combined effect of g¯M and σg˜M is studied. This allows to check if a
negotiation is possible, and how easily the two parties will conclude a merging
agreement. We assume that the larger the region defined simultaneously by (5)
and (6) the ‘simpler’ the agreement will be.
In our general setting, the extrema of intervals (5) and (6) are monotonic with
respect to g¯M and σg˜M . If we define the constant
Hi =
DA +DB
W¯i(0)
≥ 0, i = A,B,
interval (5) can be rewritten as
NA
NB
(
1 + g¯M
kM − g¯M
HB − 1
)−1
≤ r ≤ NA
NB
(
1 + g¯M
kM − g¯M
HA − 1
)
.
The infimum (resp. the supremum) of this interval decreases (resp. increases)
in g¯M ; the bargaining region defined by (3) becomes larger because the expected
wealth of shareholders of both companies increases; concluding an agreement
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i di(0) g¯i σg˜i ki Ni
A 0.6 1% 2% 4% 1 000
B 0.3 3% 9% 8% 2 500
(a) Parameters
i P¯i σi fi W¯i ωi
A 20.2 1.68 0.0832 20 200 0.57
B 6.18 1.87 0.3026 15 450 0.43
(b) SDDM results
Table 1: Companies A and B pre-merging values
becomes easier. If we, instead, define the constant
Ji =
(1 + kM )Hi
fi
≥ 0, i = A,B,
the region defined by (4) can be written as
NA
NB
(
h (g¯M , σg˜M )
kM − g¯M
JA − 1
)
≤ r ≤ NA
NB
(
h (g¯M , σg˜M )
kM − g¯M
JB − 1
)−1
.
Again, it is straightforward to prove that the infimum (resp. the supremum) of
this interval increases (resp. decreases) both in g¯M (for each positive σg˜M ) and
σg˜M (for each g¯M > −1). Here, room for negotiation diminishes if the post-
merger standard deviation σg˜M increases because it becomes difficult to achieve a
lower post-merger risk. An increase in g¯M has the same effect; this is so because
the mean is the value that minimizes the centered second order moment. Quite
interestingly, and somehow counter-intuitively, a variation in g¯M has two opposite
consequences on the region of negotiation, the overall result depending on which
effect is dominating.
Table (1.a) depicts the parameters describing pre-merger companies A and
B while Table (1.b) reports their SDDM relevant values (stock prices mean and
standard deviation, coefficient of variation, absolute (W¯i) and relative (ωi) equity
values). As fB > fA, the target company is riskier than the acquiring. According
to Yagil, the discount rate for M is 5.72%.
As a benchmark, if gM replaces g¯M Figure 1 presents, in the plane (g¯M , r),
the Yagil’s bargaining region, defined by the extrema of interval (5); each point
belonging to the region between the two curves, on the right of their intersection
point, is such that the stock price of the new company satisfy shareholders of both
companies, being admissible for the negotiation. In Figure 2 we fix four levels of
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σg˜M , namely 1%, 1.5%, 2%, 2.5%, and superimpose, for each of them, extrema
of interval (6) (dashed curves) on the solid curves of Figure 1, which still depict
extrema of interval (5). Each point of the region bounded by the two dashed curves
on the left of their intersection point fulfills shareholders’ requirements of a smaller
wealth variance. The shaded area in each of the four plots in Figure 2 represents
the overall resulting bargaining region, which can eventually be empty (Figure
2.d). Looking at each plot, it results evident that an increase in σg˜M reduces
the possibility of negotiation and positively concluding an agreement becomes
increasingly difficult. Indeed, the example shows how negotiation does not even
take place with σg˜M = 2.5% as A’s shareholders will not accept an excessive
post-merger increase in their wealth variance.
All regions represented in Figure 2 shows that negotiation can take place only
if g¯M ≥ 1.88%. Further, if g¯M = 1.88%, that is the merger creates no synergy,
then the unique acceptable exchange ratio is r∗ = 0.3059. This level is larger
than the pre-merger company A’s expected rate, g¯A = 1% (Table 1.a). Therefore,
as long as σg˜M is sufficiently small stockholders of the acquiring company can
accept exchange ratios larger than 1 (Figures 2.a and 2.b). On the other hand,
g¯M can be way smaller than g¯B as the merger will reward B’s stockholders with a
sharp reduction in the standard deviation of their wealth. In fact, the numerical
examples shows that negotiation takes place when σg˜M is far smaller then σg˜B =
9%. B’s shareholders accept small exchange ratios; in Figures 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c
the minimum accepted rate is always less than 0.5 because the reduction in the
expected dividends’ growth rate is adequately rewarded with a smaller level of
risk. Lastly, as long as σg˜M increases, the minimum r accepted by B increases
whereas the maximum r offered by A decreases. This occurs until the recuction
in standard deviation is no more sufficient to satisfy shareholders’ requests.
4 Concluding remarks
This article deals with exchange ratio determination model by Yagil and tries to
extend it into a stochastic framework where both expected value and variance
of stockholders’ wealth have to be considered when evaluating a plausible range
for the exchange ratio in stock-for-stock merger agreements. It turns out that
dividends’ rate of growth of the company that the merger creates plays a double,
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Figure 1: The case studied in Yagil (1987).
conflicting role. In fact, such growth rate is responsible for changes in both the
expected value and variance of stockholders’ wealth. It is not always true, at
least in this framework, that merging companies should uniquely strive for a large
post-merger growth rate as an augmented wealth variance might suggest to either
shareholders of the acquired or acquiring companies, or possibly to both groups,
not to accept the agreement.
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